Challenging Malaria: The Private and Social Incentives of Mosquito Control

Carson III, Byron B.

  • 出版商: Palgrave MacMillan
  • 出版日期: 2024-09-29
  • 售價: $5,530
  • 貴賓價: 9.5$5,254
  • 語言: 英文
  • 頁數: 240
  • 裝訂: Quality Paper - also called trade paper
  • ISBN: 3031395123
  • ISBN-13: 9783031395123
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商品描述

Five years after Ronald Ross discovered the link between malaria and mosquitos, American entomologist Leland Howard wrote of the "mosquito evil" that occurs when "everybody's business is nobody's business." Howard's insight was largely ignored, but it captures what social scientists now refer to as the problem of collective action.

When this problem persists in the context of malaria, individuals under-provide prevention and suffer from a higher prevalence of malaria. Imagine a group of people trying to drain a pond where mosquitoes breed. Everyone in the group faces an incentive to free ride, which can hinder their drainage efforts. Thus, when people fail to resolve issues related to collective action, they submit to the "mosquito evil" and, potentially, to malaria.

This book explores Howard's logic, the economics of collective action, and the history, epidemiology, and public health of malaria to analyze the conditions under which peopleprivately resolve collective action problems associated with mosquito abatement and malaria prevention. Generally, people are more likely to resolve these problems when the benefits of abatement and prevention outweigh the costs. This logic is developed into a framework and applied to historical and modern-day issues related to malaria, including the lack or abundance of private prevention in the United States and in developing areas; malaria's resurgence in countries like China, Venezuela, and Bangladesh; and the difficulties of large-scale insecticide-treated bed net campaigns. Given this framework, we should develop a greater appreciation for entrepreneurial responses, civil society, market processes, and private forms of collective action.

商品描述(中文翻譯)

五年後,羅納德·羅斯發現了瘧疾與蚊子之間的聯繫,美國昆蟲學家利蘭·霍華德寫到了當「每個人的事都是沒有人在管的事」時所發生的「蚊子邪惡」。霍華德的見解在當時大多被忽視,但它捕捉到了社會科學家現在所稱的集體行動問題。

當這個問題在瘧疾的背景下持續存在時,個體在預防方面的投入不足,導致瘧疾的流行率更高。想像一群人試圖排乾一個蚊子繁殖的池塘。這群人中的每個人都面臨著搭便車的誘因,這可能會妨礙他們的排水努力。因此,當人們未能解決與集體行動相關的問題時,他們就會屈從於「蚊子邪惡」,並可能因此感染瘧疾。

本書探討霍華德的邏輯、集體行動的經濟學,以及瘧疾的歷史、流行病學和公共衛生,以分析人們在何種條件下能夠私下解決與蚊子防治和瘧疾預防相關的集體行動問題。一般而言,當防治的好處超過成本時,人們更有可能解決這些問題。這一邏輯被發展成一個框架,並應用於與瘧疾相關的歷史和現代問題,包括美國和發展中國家私有預防的缺乏或豐富;中國、委內瑞拉和孟加拉等國家瘧疾的再度流行;以及大規模殺蟲劑處理床網運動的困難。基於這一框架,我們應該更加欣賞企業家的反應、公民社會、市場過程以及私有形式的集體行動。

作者簡介

Byron B. Carson, III is Associate Professor of Economics and Business at Hampden-Sydney College in Hampden-Sydney, Virginia (USA). He teaches courses on introductory economics, money and banking, development economics, health economics, and urban economics. He earned a Ph.D. in Economics from George Mason University and a B.A. in Economics from Rhodes College. His research interests include economic epidemiology, public choice, and Austrian economics.


作者簡介(中文翻譯)

Byron B. Carson, III 是美國維吉尼亞州漢普登-西德尼學院的經濟學與商業副教授。他教授的課程包括入門經濟學、貨幣與銀行、發展經濟學、健康經濟學以及城市經濟學。他在喬治梅森大學獲得經濟學博士學位,並在羅德學院獲得經濟學學士學位。他的研究興趣包括經濟流行病學、公共選擇以及奧地利經濟學。