The Skeptic and the Veridicalist: On the Difference Between Knowing What There Is and Knowing What Things Are

Avnur, Yuval

  • 出版商: Cambridge
  • 出版日期: 2024-01-18
  • 售價: $1,080
  • 貴賓價: 9.5$1,026
  • 語言: 英文
  • 頁數: 62
  • 裝訂: Quality Paper - also called trade paper
  • ISBN: 1009243322
  • ISBN-13: 9781009243322
  • 海外代購書籍(需單獨結帳)

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商品描述

This Element explores the nature and formulation of skepticism about the external world by considering an important anti-skeptical strategy, 'veridicalism.' According to veridicalism, even if you are in a skeptical scenario, your beliefs about the existence of ordinary objects are still true. For example, even if you are in a global simulation, things such as tables exist as simulated objects. Therefore, your ignorance of whether you are in such a scenario does not negate your knowledge that there are tables. This strategy fails because it raises an equally troubling skepticism about what such objects are: is the table you now see a simulated object? That this is equally troubling suggests that the core skeptical problem is about what the causes of our experiences are, regardless of whether they count as ordinary objects like tables. This motivates a reconsideration of the standard formulation of the skeptical argument, and undermines some other anti-skeptical strategies as well.

商品描述(中文翻譯)

本書探討了對外部世界的懷疑性質和形成,並考慮了一種重要的反懷疑策略,即「真實主義」。根據真實主義,即使你處於一個懷疑的情境中,你對於普通物體的存在的信念仍然是真實的。例如,即使你處於全球模擬中,像桌子這樣的東西仍然存在作為模擬物體。因此,你對於是否處於這樣的情境中的無知並不否定你對於桌子存在的知識。然而,這種策略失敗了,因為它同樣引發了對於這些物體是什麼的令人困擾的懷疑:你現在看到的桌子是一個模擬物體嗎?這同樣令人困擾的事實表明,核心的懷疑問題是關於我們經驗的原因是什麼,而不論它們是否被視為像桌子這樣的普通物體。這促使我們重新考慮懷疑論論證的標準形式,並且也削弱了其他一些反懷疑策略。